

# Philipp Peitler

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## Fields of Research

Microeconomics, Social Choice, Decision Theory, Industrial Organization, Behavioral Economics.

## Education

2024	<b>PhD in Economics</b> Vienna Graduate School of Economics Advisors: Karl Schlag and Maarten Janssen
2018	<b>MSc in Economics</b> University of Vienna
2016	<b>BSc in Economics</b> University of Vienna

## Working Papers

- **JMP: [Putting Context into Preference Aggregation](#)** (with Karl Schlag)

*Abstract:* The axioms underlying Arrow's impossibility theorem are very restrictive in terms of what can be used when aggregating preferences. Social preferences may not depend on the menu nor on preferences over alternatives outside the menu. But context matters. So, we weaken these restrictions to allow for context to be included. The context, as we define, describes which alternatives in the menu and which preferences over alternatives outside the menu matter. We obtain unique representations. These are discussed in examples involving markets, the intertemporal well-being of an individual, and bargaining.

- **JMP: [Rational Bargaining: Characterization and Implementation](#)**

*Abstract:* The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are uncontroversial desiderata for individual decision-making. We say that a bargaining solution is rational if it can be interpreted as the most preferred alternatives under these axioms. Yet, neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution is rational in this sense. We formalize two consequences of rationality, namely that one can neither be strictly better off nor strictly worse off from randomizing over different actions. These two axioms, together with other standard axioms, characterize the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. We then implement this bargaining solution in sub-game perfect equilibrium.

- **[Price Transparency and Consumer Search in Service Markets](#)**
- **[Axiomatizing Preferences over Varying Time Horizons](#)**

## Conferences, Seminars & Workshops

2024	University of Bonn (Seminar)
2024	GRAPE - IMD, Warsaw (Seminar)
2024	Umeå University (Seminar)
2023	Brown University Lunch Seminar
2023	SAET Conference, Paris
2023	D-TEA Workshop, Paris
2022	QED Jamboree, Vienna
2022	Asian School in Economic Theory, Singapore
2022	Innsbruck Winter Summit - Un(Ethical) Behavior in Markets
2022	MaCCI Annual Conference, Mannheim
2021	DICE Brown Bag Seminar
2020	Warsaw Economic Seminars - Theory and Decisions

## Grants

2021	Research Grant “Jubiläumsfonds” (under Karl Schlag as PI), Austrian National Bank 99,000 Euro
2020	Research Grant “Small Research Grant”, University of Vienna 1,212 Euro

## Other Professional Activities

I’ve co-organizing the *Vienna Workshop on Social Choice and Fairness: Connecting Theory, Experiments and Applications* (March 11, 2024).

<https://sites.google.com/view/viennasocialchoice2024>

Refereeing: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics

## Teaching Experience

TA in Game Theory (graduate) in the years 2019, 2020 and 2021.

## Other Information

Nationality: Austrian  
Languages: English (fluent), German (native)